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Summary
Our understanding of 'reactions to trauma' is dominated by concepts like Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. The use of such concepts has been criticised but si-
multaneously integrated, in folk-psychology. Connecting emotional and cognitive
processes as well as acts – such as in gendered practices – to praxis, and drawing
on the concept of symbolic violence, this article contributes to their critique. In
order to develop the analysis of difficulties victims may experience, they will be
reconceptualised using critical psychological concepts such as 1st person perspec-
tives and participation. The analysis seeks to undertake a discussion of personal
meanings attributed to 'traumatisation'. It raises questions as to whether concepts
of this kind and related practices may constitute symbolic violence and contribute
to victimisation through processes of looping. Furthermore it aims to unfold an
understanding inclusive of connections between societal practices, aspects of
symbolic violence, and the conduct of lives. The analysis is based on an empirical
study of victimisation through rape and other forms of sexualised coercion.
Keywords: 1st person perspectives, trauma, symbolic violence, rape, looping effects
Introduction
The lines above from Hannah’s poem express thoughts and feelings that most of
us connect with having been subjected to sexualised coercion*FOOTNO-
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TE_REF_1*. That this connection is not always as simple and linear as we may
think, and why this is not so, is a turning point of this paper.
In 2002-2003 I was employed as a psychologist and researcher at Centre
for Victims of Sexual Assault in Copenhagen (Sidenius & Pedersen 2004). Re-
viewing international literature, I found it to be vast and diverse. Some older
publications conceptualise the consequences of sexualised coercion as a life crisis,
and there is a body of psychoanalytic work as well (Ringel & Brandell 2011).
But overall the concepts of trauma and of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder dominate
the field. Studies are rarely concerned with questions of agency, which are parti-
cularly precarious in victimology, or with questions of culture/society, (Salkvist
& Pedersen 2008).
Furthermore, although women still dominate the Danish rape statistics, in
it is generally assumed that gender equality has been achieved. Consequently
national research rarely includes a gender perspective, nor other aspects of psycho-
social conditions related to the phenomenon. In similarity with mainstream
professional discourses as well as with folk psychology, research most commonly
depicts sexualised coercion as an individual and particularly traumatic experience.
The overwhelming impression left by dominant discourses is then that sexualised
coercion is performed by deviant, pathological and criminal persons (Emmerson
& Frosh 2001), is 'traumatising', and leaves anyone subjected to it in great and
identical forms of distress. As exceptions to this widespread individualisation of
the issue many feminist studies, mainly British and American, understand victi-
misation through sexualised coercion as a social question of gender. Yet, feminist
or not, very few studies are based on the perspectives of women themselves, and,
with a few notable exceptions, most also generalise unchallenged assumptions
about the traumatising meanings of the events (Gavey 2005, Marecek 1999).
Conduct of Everyday Life and Symbolic Violence
In as much as it negates human rights of self-determination with regards to
where, when, with whom, and what kind of sex I choose to have, sexualised
coercion is without doubt violence and a crime, no matter who is subjected to it
and what it means to them in particular. Yet recognising this does not exclude
the necessity of raising new questions concerning our understanding of victimi-
sation, questions of why sexualised coercion is committed, its links to societal
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conditions, or even questions that may challenge the taken-for-granted associations
with the concepts of trauma (Mardorossian 2002). Such questions must be explo-
red by diverse disciplines, in theory as well as in practice (Marquard 1997).
As a contribution to the exploration of such questions, I examine the personal
meanings of sexualised coercion from a social-psychological point of view. Taking
1st person perspectives as my starting point, instead 3rd person perspectives such
as those exemplified in diagnostic categories (Danziger 1990, 1997, Schraube
forthcoming) my endeavour is to explore some of the social and personal meanings
of what we conceptualise as trauma and sexualised coercion. My theoretical basis
is a critical theory of persons and their conduct of life. By critical theory I mean
a theory that relates critically to theoretical approaches in an effort to indicate
their weak points, but also to reconceptualise their insights. Furthermore, critical
also implies linking personal suffering and difficulties to societal conditions for
their conduct of life. Thus exploration of agency is at the core of this approach.
As used here the concept of agency implies not only specific and personal reasons
for, intentions with, and conditions for, conducting life. These conditions are
seen as situated in time and place, e.g. as locally situated variations of common
historical societal conditions (Dreier 2008, Holzkamp 1998, Nissen 2005). Thus
concepts like contexts of actions, participation, situated perspectives and meanings
become central in linking perspectives to historical societal conditions, among
these to institutionalised dominant discourses and locally situated personal varia-
tions of such discourses. Using such concepts this approach permits an analytical
embedding of 1st person perspectives on social phenomena in situated practices.
It also permits an embedding of the complexities of the personal conduct of life
and its meanings and consequences.
But this approach may fruitfully be supplemented with sociological theory.
One sociological and theoretical concept is Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic vio-
lence. For reasons that will be elaborated in this article, I have chosen to explore
the analytical possibilities of this concept when connected with a critical theory
of subjects. According to Bourdieu, relations of physical and societal power are
simultaneously expressed symbolically. But, although related to societal relations,
such as economy and politics, symbols, symbolic distinctions and relations, like
those produced in science, religion and education do not automatically or directly
mirror societal power relations of the former kind. Conversely, symbolic relations
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are relatively autonomous, concealing their dependence on other societal relations
of power.
Acts of submission and obedience to all kinds of relations of power involve
cognitive and emotional processes, forms and categories of perception, principles
of vision and division (Bourdieu 1998, 53), as those that categorise persons with
psychiatric/psychological classifications. As such, symbolic power is embedded
in praxis through the practices of concrete persons, and contributes to them. It
is constituted through processes of embodiment of classifications into personal
standpoints and habits, frequently in the shape of tacit and pre-reflexive agreement
with dominant meanings attributed to diverse aspects of life. In this way symbolic
violence rests on the adjustments of the relationship between forms of subjectivity
that are constitutive of the dominated and dominant (Bourdieu 1998, 121), as
well as dependent on concrete and situated social structurations of domination.
Such structurations may be institutional and institutionalised as in many aspects
of the psy disciplines (Rose 1998).
Furthermore, Bourdieu designates the embodiment of gender inequality,
in which he regards both men and women as 'willing' accomplices, as the paradigm
of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1990, 19, 170). One aspect of the dynamics of
symbolic violence is that 'dominated' ways of conducting life are almost always
perceived, even by dominated subjects, from the limiting and reductive points
of view of dominant perspectives (Bourdieu 1998, 9). As symbolic power relations,
and symbolic violence connected to them, constitute concealed relations of vio-
lence seemingly not connected to other relations of power, it is a form of
power/violence to which one may comply with 'grace'. Whereas refusal or even
resistance to comply may engender reinforced symbolic violence (as in social
marginalisation), and/or physical violence. An illustration of this is when women,
although not wanting to do so, may tacitly subject themselves to intercourse, or
do so under protest. Such events may not be designated as 'real rape' (Gavey
2005)*FOOTNOTE_REF_2*. Yet resistance, and sometimes equally non-resi-
stance, may elicit physical violence, as in what we consider to be 'real rape'. Based
on socially incorporated beliefs and expectations, symbolic violence thus extorts
submission (Bourdieu 1998,103), in this case sexualised submission of women,
infrequently perceived and condemned as such. Another effect of symbolic vio-
lence may be the transfiguration of domination and submission into affective
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relations (Bourdieu 1998,102), as in marriages and other couple relationships
involving severe restrictions in the lives of participants, or even forced intercourse
and other relations of physical violence. A further example of symbolic violence
may be when concepts, developed in the 3rd person perspectives of psy disciplines,
disguise the social aspects of personal difficulties and suffering, especially when
the understanding implied in such concepts becomes part of folk psychology and
the self-understanding of persons in distress. It may then stand in the way of
understanding difficulties as related to the conditions for one’s conduct of life,
and of their change.
Exploring the concept of trauma and the meanings of sexualised coercion
I draw on this understanding of symbolic violence: a form of violence that is not
necessarily expressed or enforced directly by physical violence, but embedded in
concrete situated social practices and embodied by the subject. Its influence in
smoothing over potential conflicts of interest in person’s conduct of life, such as
those between professionals and persons who seek help or gendered conflicts of
interest, is not exclusively that it conceals conflicting interests. It is equally that,
from the 1st person perspectives of men as well as of women, relations of power,
including more evident and extreme practices such as subjecting women to sexua-
lised coercion and reactions to them, may appear to be universal, natural and
unavoidable. In consequence relations of power become implicit but nevertheless
simultaneously known to all, although in warped and indiscernible forms.
Diagnostic Approach and Complexity Reduction
Connecting symbolic relations of power with dominant and dominating social
practices, one may identify diverse relations of symbolic violence that are active
in shaping the conduct of our lives and our self-perceptions.
In the case of the personal meanings of sexualised coercion there are at least
two intersecting forms of relations at play: practices of the psy disciplines and
gendered practices.
Firstly, let us examine aspects of how the psy complex*FOOTNO-
TE_REF_3* (Parker 2001) is involved in creating distinctions in the practical/sym-
bolic meanings of overwhelming experiences such as sexualised coercion, which
we understand as 'traumatising'. Bourdieu connects symbolic relations, as the
ones involved in the psy complex, to markets (Bourdieu in Brunner 1996/2003,
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114). This is thought-provoking as it reveals one aspect in the process of (symbo-
lic) victimisation, which is often neglected. It is related to a multi-million dollar
industry partially dependent on the catch-all concept of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (APA 2000, Linder 2004). Sales of tests, questionnaires, diagnostic in-
struments, treatment packages, and many jobs rely on its use. And to boot dia-
gnosis and treatment of 'PTSD' has become an industry that has spread throug-
hout the world, supporting the promotion of its use.
Although the diagnostic approach appears to be helpful, and definitely has
furthered public recognition of the suffering of many, it implies aspects of sym-
bolic violence. In the contested name of objectivity (Danziger 1990, 1977) it is
assumed that 'trauma' and 'traumatic experiences' are the same to all people at
all times and places, result in the same personal problems, and may thus be defined
in disregard of its multiple and complex constellations of personal and cultural/so-
cietal meanings. This reductive approach detaches human suffering from situated
personal, concrete and intentional participation in, and subjection to historical
relations of power and domination. It constitutes a development of what has
been termed 'natural kinds' that suggest absolute psychological priority, and as
one may add biological priority, of personal phenomena. Categorisation into
natural kinds may be subsumed under Bourdieu’s concept of relations of symbolic
violence. Instead, the use of what may be termed 'relevant kinds' is suggested.
They could be understood as habitual and/or developed for a reason (Hacking
1999,128). An example of the use of natural kinds may be that, after experiencing
violent and personally overwhelming events, acts, feelings and thoughts implying
heightened and generalised social alertness may be used as one of several diagnostic
criteria for PTSD. Alternatively, such acts may be recognised as developed for
personal, context-related reasons, at times even as clearly conscious and intentional.
Having been subjected to sexualised coercion by a stranger then emerges as a re-
ason to be generally alert to signs of possible violence, even more so if sexual
coercion has been perpetrated by an acquaintance or even a friend, as is most
frequently the case.
Yet even the concept of relevant kinds and the use of such kinds in classifi-
cations of human thoughts, feelings and actions may lead us astray in our explo-
ration of personal perspectives and meanings. They may, as do natural kinds,
direct our attention in ways that contribute to unwarranted and unnecessary ge-
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neralisations and reductive categorisations. Instead, what we may use are analytical
concepts such as 'participation'. Opening up for situated complexities of personal
meanings, concepts like this help us analytically connect 1st person perspectives
to societal processes.
Generalisations and Looping Effects
Generalising is a part of research practice, as well as of practising psychology.
Without it researchers and practitioners could not draw on each other’s insights,
and would seemingly continually have to start from scratch. Simultaneously,
since all practices are codetermined by pre-existing discourses and practices,
starting from scratch is an illusion. Consequently attempts at generalising should
not be given up, but be informed by critical approaches grasping the complexities
of personal meanings and reasons. Generalising in a 1st person perspective ap-
proach means, understanding and analysing diverse and specific personal perspec-
tives as related – although in different and personal ways – to specifically situated
versions of common conditions for the conduct of lives. Generalising in this way
contributes to our insight into the complexities of personal perspectives and
agency (Dreier 2006).
When studies of the meanings of sexualised coercion do not include women’s
1st person perspectives on the conduct of their lives, the concepts, as well as the
persons involved, are robbed of intentionality and agency (Pedersen 2008a and
c, Salkvist & Pedersen 2006). Instead, dilemmas and difficulties are pathologised
in reductive, privileged and dominant 3rd person perspectives of researchers and
professional practitioners (Danziger 1990, 1997). This masks connections of
their problems to gendered societal relations and to subjections of victimised
persons as well as that of professionals to institutionalised and commercialised
aspects of symbolic and practical violence connected to psy complexes. Doing
so, it underpins dominant and gendered victim discourses (Ronkainen 2001).
Thus it contributes to the victimisation of persons who are already victimised,
such as women subjected to sexualised coercion and political refugees. They are
seen as suffering from the 'inevitable' and pathologised consequences of naturalised
events and reactions to them, as well as being in more or less inescapable need
of professional help. In individualising and victim-blaming discourses they may
even be blamed, and blame themselves, for not being cautious enough or not
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having taken responsibility for their own safety. And when, additionally, in often
well-intentioned attempts at freeing them from possible blame and self-blame,
they are designated as mere victims and as traumatised, aspects of their personal
reflections on agency concerning the events and their aftermaths may paradoxi-
cally be dismissed as irrelevant or even pathological.
Hacking discusses what he calls looping effects of classifying persons' 'de-
viances from normality', in such categories as PTSD and other diagnostic catego-
ries (Hacking 2001,160). His analysis and ensuing argument concerning such
classifications is that they may contribute to the 'symptoms' they seem to describe,
or even engender such self-conception and behaviour. Describing being exposed
to sexualised coercion as an event that is more or less inevitably traumatising,
and the relations of power and symbolic violence connected with this, may in
fact – as we will see below – contribute to an understanding of one self and others
that forms and reinforces so-called symptoms, e.g. the suffering of victims. Rela-
tions of symbolic violence generating looping effects may be involved in profes-
sional practices, as well as in other relations of everyday life. As a result, if one
does not exhibit the symptoms of traumatisation one may be seen as not suffering
in the right way, and/or to be called a liar.
Looping of symbolic and institutionalised aspects of victimisation emphasise
conceptions of events conceived as traumatic as the real, sole and/or primary
cause of suffering. Their concrete contexts and aftermaths are at best conceptua-
lised as de-situated, complexity reductive, statistically generated abstract 'factors'
aggravating naturalised 'psychological reactions' to trauma. These factors are seen
as causes for less important secondary traumatisation. Instead, in an analytical,
1st person perspective approach, changing meanings in the aftermaths may be
understood as contextualisation and re-contextualisation directly or indirectly
related to events of coercion (Salkvist & Pedersen 2008), and at times as processes
in which 'traumatisation' is primarily engendered.
Gendering Perspectives
Now, and secondly, let us return to questions of gender and symbolic violence.
Ronkainen (2001) proposes the concept of genderless gender for individualising
discursive practices that mask connections between gendered domination of
women and certain discourses and practices. She constructs what may be seen as
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a specification of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the domination of women as
practices of symbolic violence.
An important point in Ronkainen’s analysis is that, when processes of gen-
derless gender are involved, and reminiscent of the use of natural kinds, women
in general appear as natural victims. Physical and sexualised violence against them
is not understood in its connection to gendered practices of domination and
submission. Instead, when subjected to it, women like perpetrators, will be un-
derstood as exceptions from normality, as having particularly bad luck, as being
especially weak and/or even pathological. Such discursive practices are supported
by sometimes subtle and sometimes blatant individualisation, dramatisation as
well as sexualisation of RAPE by the media and other public discursive practices.
These practices may also be supported by professionals who describe sexualised
coercion in such terms as 'the trauma over all traumas, the one you never get
over'. In this sense the experience is discursively over-determined.
Furthermore, as suggested above, the event is frequently accompanied by
victim- or 'woman-blaming' (Roche & Wood 2005). 1st person perspectives on
sexualised coercion may then draw on over-determined discourses. This may be
the case when women individualise the events and blame themselves, seeing
themselves as damaged forever and feeling that they are in need of specific kinds
of professional help, or when they do not experience emotions or thoughts
commonly associated with 'trauma' and think they are not reacting correctly.
When they do not find these discourses to be representative of their own experi-
ences women may, depending on contexts, either choose not to talk about their
difficulties and/or consciously and intentionally struggle with over-determined
dominant discursive practices.
Yet as they, as well as more common societal discourses, are developed in,
and mediated by, a diversity of situated societal and personal practices, 1st person
perspectives and personal meanings are very diverse. For reasons related to their
over-determination, public discourses are simultaneously impoverished by the
absence of nuances present in 1st person perspectives. Because of possible stigma-
tisation as a victim of sexualised coercion the voices of those who have experienced
such events are rarely heard. Being dramatised and being causes for stigmatisation,
they are not openly spoken about. Seen from this angle, personal meanings of
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events of coercion, sexualised as well as others, are additionally discursively under-
determined.
In the conduct of lives of women over-determined discourses may therefore
prevail over their own frailer under-determined experiences. In looping effects
women may then perceive and interpret their feelings, thoughts and actions
through individualising and stigmatising professional and folk psychological
distinctions. Perceptions of themselves as heavily gendered pathologised victims,
including the emotional dispositions that accompany them, risk being incapaci-
tating. What is more, these approaches limit more concrete personal approaches
to what they are experiencing, especially ones that are critical of gendered societal
conditions. Thus their potentials for reflection and other aspects of agency become
restricted (Johannson 2007). Consequently in the aftermaths of the psychosocial
and physical violence of sexualised coercion, women may collaborate unwittingly
in forms of symbolic and institutionalised violence, e.g. in their own victimisation.
'Doing gender' is a term coined by Butler (1993). Her conceptualisation of
doing gender e.g. of agency does not fit quite comfortably with the theoretical
approach adopted here. To elaborate on this question within the framework of
this article would take us too far. But 'doing gender' is an inspiring concept that
may be reinterpreted in the present approach. It suggests that gender, as well as
gendered and gendering categories, are not simply essential natural kinds. They
are embodied through personal participation in societal and historical discour-
ses/practices to which we all contribute actively. Albeit we 'do' gender diversely,
at diverse times participating in and across diverse gendered practices. It has di-
verse personal and situated meanings. When we comply to, attempt to negate or
even change the personal and societal meanings of gender, we are relating to
questions of gender. Although it often disappears from view in processes of gen-
derless gender, sexualised coercion is obviously a gendered and gendering practice.
In the study on which this article is based, and working with a 1st person
perspective approach, it seemed reasonable to understand many of the participant’s
problems as directly or indirectly connected to gendered meanings of social rela-
tions. One example of gendering are practices designating body and sexuality as
essential to women’s participation, identities and self-image (Cahill 2001), and
sexualised coercion therefore as a particularly identity-damaging crime. Another
example is that in accordance with late-modern Scandinavian perspectives on
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gender and sexuality – seeing themselves as equal to men and free to choose the
character of their relations to them – the young women did not expect that they
could be exposed to sexualised coercion. Ignoring or negating gendered differences
of conditions for their conduct of life may actually have contributed to their
subjection to a gendered crime. Subsequent changes in personal perspectives on
such phenomena as sexualisation of women in public spaces and in the media,
are frequently (mis)interpreted as symptoms of traumatisation. From the perspec-
tives of the women in this study they were newly developed and relevant perspec-
tives unmasking symbolic and other relations of power and violence.
This was also the case for other changes in their gendered and sexual relati-
ons, and for their perspectives on these (Pedersen 2008b). The examples here are
examples of processes of genderless gender at play. Significantly, the participants
customarily or even exclusively expressed changes in their perspectives on gender
and gendering during reflections connected to concluding interviews. One may
assume that symbolic violence inherent in dominant discourses on gender relations
and on traumatisation, co-determined the fragility of the expression of such and
other reflections. Also questions that are considered political – like critically ad-
dressing gender – are considered inappropriate in mainstream psychological
theory and practice (Callaghan 2005, Montero 2001).
Studying Traumatic Events
My interest in and analysis of the mechanisms of symbolic violence is evidently
not exclusively based on theoretical deliberations and the meagre critical literature
available on the subject. It was developed in and through the analysis of case re-
ports from 40 series of consultations supplemented with 15 interviews with women
at Centre for Victims of Sexual Assault in Copenhagen. Like most research mine
is also based on accounts and deliberations of women who seek professional
support. Yet, women who contacted the Centre did not consistently experience
the events as traumatising. This is surprising in as much as they came for help
and that it contradicts dominant trauma discourses.
Most empirical research into the meanings of violent and/or overwhelming
events is conducted as surveys or interviews based on preconceptions of symptoms
of traumatisation. This kind of inquiry, as in all symbolic and other forms of in-
teraction, implies preconceptions of their subject. But some are more likely than
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others to promote possibilities of presenting the diversified and complex reasons
for feelings, thoughts and actions of 1st person perspectives. Including continuous
personal reflections and deliberations on meanings of sexualised coercion as they
emerged over time and place in the conduct of lives of participants is therefore
a relatively unique aspect of the study informing this article. These 1st person
perspectives indicate how, where and when, the difficulties and sufferings of the
women were associated with and related to symbolic definitions and meanings
embedded in diverse practices in which they took part – and were subjected to –
in the aftermaths of coercion.
Suffering connected to being questioned by police and waiting for trial are
aspects well known from other studies. But, in addition, not being believed, being
treated and stigmatised as incapacitated victims or as irresponsible women, being
stalked and threatened by perpetrators, being left by boyfriends, criticised by
friends and relatives, excluded from studies, work and other social contexts that
demand your engagement, at times resulting in severe economic difficulties and
social isolation, characterised the experiences of many. Difficulties such as these,
as well as others more or less specifically connected to gendered discourses and
practices, as well as to specific aspects of personal lives, interacted in the difficulties
and suffering of participants. When not analysed from a 1st person perspective
the difficulties ensuing here from may, just like their changes in personal perspec-
tives mentioned above, easily be understood in terms of symptoms of PTSD. But
instead of 'natural kinds' what Hacking (2001) describes as relevant kinds, e.g.
in this approach concepts relating experiences to concrete situations may so to
speak, be more relevant to persons involved in psychological practices be they
researchers, professionals or seeking help. In as much as they interacted within
the personal conduct of life of the women, and at times even constituted aspects
of vicious cycles reinforcing their different meanings (Pedersen & Stormhøj
2006), such problems as the ones described above had complex situated constel-
lations of personal meanings.
In the beginning of their participation in therapy sessions every participant
was asked what she was most worried about and needed to talk about. All except
one of the 40 women replied: whom to tell about the experience. This strongly
indicates the social meanings of the events. It points to these as essential aspects
of the ongoing ascription of meanings in a continuous situated conduct of life,
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and as reasons for distress. The meanings of the event are not static. Nor does
the experience itself in the consultations with the women emerge as the core issue.
Again and again they address difficulties like the ones described above, the distress
they caused, and how to deal with them.
Changing Meanings in the Conduct of Life
One woman verbalised an aspect of the possible aftermaths described above by
saying: '…Things have happened to you that cannot be comprehended by your friends,
and all of a sudden their interests are different from yours. And even when you sit
there surrounded by friends and stuff, you can feel so alone. And it is weird to sit
there surrounded by friends feeling lonely. Because they cannot, they cannot really
understand what is going on with you…' What she was referring to when saying
things have happened to you, was not exclusively the event of coercion. It was,
among many other difficulties, being stalked by the man in question (who belon-
ged to an ethnic minority), being threatened, feeling her son threatened, and
being admonished for letting the man into her house where the event had taken
place. But although she, like the other participants of the study, used most of her
session time to reflect on events in the aftermaths, this woman had great problems
in coming to terms with the experience itself. The reasons for her special difficul-
ties emerged quite quickly during her sessions. She had experienced coercion by
a former boyfriend and was afraid that she looked like a 'typical rape victim'.
Remarkably, the personal meanings of the 2nd event of victimisation did not
seem to connect directly to the first event. Rather, it was mediated by embodied
folk psychological and psy discourses about 'typical victim personalities' embedded
in her conduct of life. This had been underscored by her GP commenting that
what had happened was to be expected when associating with men from ethnic
minorities.
As the event of coercion had taken place in her home it was difficult for her
to escape being constantly reminded of it. She suspected that the perpetrator was
armed, and she had been terrified that he would harm her son sleeping in the
adjacent room. Furthermore, drawing on concepts from her studies in the health
professions, she reflected on the potential personal harm of the event itself. She
specifically drew on such concepts as trauma and traumatisation. On the one
hand, reflecting that they did not quite properly fit her own experience, she was
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critical of the standardising descriptions characteristic of such concepts. For a
while and for this reason she chose to term the event coercion and not rape. On
the other, she at times drew on psy concepts in judging the severity of harm done
to her by the event of coercion. Addressing the severity she did again not only
mean the event as such. However her perspective was characterised by a specific
insistence on having suffered harm. This insistence seemed to be a justification
of her rights to help, understanding and support, of which she had and expected
little, as well as to her claim to the right to be angry with the perpetrator and
people who did not understand or support her.
Though she used the term coercion for a while, she was the only woman in
the study who ended up calling her experience rape. It was a term most of the
women did not want to use. They rejected it because of its dominant, dramatic
and often implicit connotations to passive victimhood, identity as victim, severe
traumatisation (cp Gavey and Schmidt 2011) and even sexuality, connotations
rarely corresponding to their experiences. They did not think they could be
meaningfully applied to their own more complex and more or less distressing
experiences of events of coercion and the time after. They were also connotations
that they saw as worsening their distressing difficulties. But the woman in ques-
tion used the connotations to underscore her moral judgement of the event and
its severe meanings for her life and that of other women.
These symbolic processes illustrate among many other the double edge of
looping effects and symbolic violence often connected to 3rd person perspective
categories and categorisations. On the one hand such concepts may be personally
adopted and help us all identify and recognise (in the double sense of the word)
phenomena and personal suffering, as well as support claims to help. On the
other, they may contribute to stigmatisation and reduce possibilities for under-
standing reasons for conduct of life as related to conditions for life. It may also
make us miss out on the changes in meanings depending on place. The women
quoted here described how what she felt varied according to the contexts in which
she participated. When at work she felt effective, competent and at ease. When
sitting at home working on an exam paper, like she had the day she experienced
coercion, she invariably felt frightened and could not concentrate.
Another young participant was also a student of a health profession. Partici-
pating in group sessions for at Centre she commented on reductive generalisations
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concerning victims of sexualised coercion by insisting: 'We have things in common.
But we are also different.' She, like most others participating in the study, did not
wish to be seen and treated as A TRAUMATISED RAPE VICTIM (Pedersen
2008c). She wanted to stress that the women in the group had diverse experiences,
lives and ways of conducting these lives. The event of coercion she experienced
was itself much more violent than that experienced by the woman above, but for
her it was central that she had suffered because of being '…treated only as a vic-
tim…' in a period following the event. 'I am still myself', she insisted.
Priority of the Aftermaths?
A young woman who participated in the study had also been subjected to sexua-
lised coercion at the age of twelve. At the time she attended group therapy. Par-
ticipants were told by the therapist that having had the same kind of experiences
and problems the girls may recognise themselves in each other. Starting sessions
of consultation at the Centre she, like the other women of the study, had been
informed that she did not need to describe the event of coercion unless she wished
to, since it had been recorded in their files at the medical examination on their
arrival at the Centre. In an interview after having stopped attending consultations,
she, like all other interviewees, was asked whether she wanted to add something
to the interview, she replied: 'No…Oh yes… it was good that we didn’t talk about
it… what happened at the event you know…oh, but actually we did, but only when
it was important' (for the meanings of her current conduct of life). Her reply
again indicates the embedding of the meanings of the events in the daily conduct
of the lives. In addition and importantly, it also points to a practical priority of
this ongoing life for the personal meanings of the events over time and place.
Consequently it suggests the necessity of, at least at times and in some cases, allo-
wing it priority in theory and practice (Salkvist and Pedersen 2008), a priority
not included and not possible in a diagnostic cause and effect linking of event
and symptoms.
Over time, consultations suggested that the women who suffered most and
were in need of help over longer periods were those to whom the event had posed
the greatest physical threat. But again this was not consistently so. Women
whose general conditions for the conduct of life in the aftermaths were exceptio-
nally difficult, like Hannah’s – the young women who wrote the introductory
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poem above – were generally most distressed and experiencing 'symptoms' des-
cribed by PTSD. Again not everyone experienced these kinds of distress. When
they did they had very diverse personal meanings, and could frequently be imme-
diately and concretely linked to aspects of the conduct of their lives after coercion,
such as the ones described earlier.
For an informative comparison one may read Brison’s book 'Aftermath'
(2002) in which she portrays the aftermath of her own experience of coercion.
The book is a deeply relevant personal account of a series of great difficulties and
distress. But it may be read in at least to ways. The first reading seems to draw
attention to a generalised traumatising effect of sexualised coercion as a delimited
event, as well as to relief stemming from diagnostisation/recognition. This is a
reading in line with the mainstream classification of PTSD, as well as with the
insistence of some theoreticians and practitioners on a more or less unequivocal
traumatising effect of sexualized coercion, and on the necessity for psychological
treatment (Marecek 1999).
In a somewhat contradictory fashion the book may also be read as a 1st
person account of specific personal meanings of surviving an attack one’s life,
the lack of recognition of this, as well as of other situated personal difficulties
and meanings in the aftermaths of sexualised coercion. Read in this way, it seems
to point to looping effects of diagnostic concepts and other discourses on rape,
and accordingly to alternative interpretations of the so-called primary and secon-
dary effects of sexualised coercion.
Alternative interpretations are hinted at in Mardorossian’s critique of some
current thinking and practice in women’s agencies (2002). Here she met women
whose stories, from her standpoint as a feminist and a counsellor, simply did not
fit discourses on the inescapability of traumatisation due to sexualised coercion.
In connection with my project as well, but outside the Centre, quite a few women
spoke to me of having been subjected to sexualised coercion. However they did
not all experience personally serious problems ensuing from the event. In addition
in the study women’s emphasis on the meanings of contexts and aftermaths
challenges de-situated 'cause and effect' notions implicit in abstract notions of
trauma, as well as those of primary and secondary traumatisation (Pedersen
2008a). Interestingly, Hannah recaptured aspects of her experience over time in
the following way: '… I think maybe (the meanings of) the event of coercion itself
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lasted 30 percent of the time, and then all the rest 70'. Hence her experiences, as
well as those of other women, question the notion that the event of sexualised
coercion as such invariably is the primary cause of distress.
These empirical findings, as well as Mardorossian’s and Gavey’s work, sup-
plemented with theoretical reflections as those presented in this article may con-
tribute to explain why even women who contacted the Centre for help did not
all experience what we commonly call traumatisation or PTSD. Nor did they
invariably experience any other symptoms described by diverse other classifications,
such as depression, which have been used to categorise experiences defined as
traumatising. Meanwhile accounts like these, in some approaches, not be heard,
not taken into account or not taken seriously. They could even be taken to indi-
cate that trauma was being repressed and women in special need of professional
treatment. Stressing 1st person perspectives researchers and practitioners risk
being considered naïve and unprofessional. But does a 1st person perspective
approach imply that we should refrain from interpretation? No, although it in-
cludes the voices of persons whose lives are being researched, the 1st person ap-
proach is essentially an analytic approach. It is not to be confused with an ap-
proach in which perspectives of participants are seen as their essential and real
voices and as completely explanatory. Yet a 1st person perspective approach differs
radically from mainstream approaches. In these the basic concepts are abstracted
from 1st person perspectives, as these are understood to be subjective and there-
fore not scientific. The 1st person approach is an interpretive approach in which
personal perspectives are analysed as mediated. In linking personal meanings of
the conduct of life to conditions for this conduct, it examines the complexity of
diversely linked personal and societal reasons for feelings, thoughts, meanings
and action.
At the insistence of her boyfriend a young women contacted the Centre
again several months after being subjected to coercion. She did so because, though
having attended sessions immediately after the event, she now described her life
as falling to pieces. She had isolated herself at home and become increasingly
passive, dissatisfied and irritable, also with her boyfriend. She and especially her
boyfriend were convinced that her difficulties were an effect of having experienced
sexualised coercion. The course of her life after the event was clearly related to
this. She was experiencing a lack of trust in people she did not know, a distrust
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she had not experienced previously, and had for this reason given up her new job
at a post office. Meanwhile the question was still whether her conduct of life at
the time and her emotional evaluations of this life, could in any simple or
straightforward fashion be understood to be caused directly by the event of
coercion and ensuing Post-Traumatic Stress, depression or any other diagnostic
category.
The difficulties she described were in many ways reminiscent of those persons
who are out of work may describe. Conversations with her showed that she had
failed to return to her university studies at the beginning of term. Discussing
this, it turned out that before the event of coercion she had been considering
whether to study at the university was what she wanted. Clearing up this issue
central to her conduct of life, as well as other changes, some more directly related
to the experience, such as a new perspective on the sexualisation of women and
her use of alcoholic drinks (she had been drunk as the event took place), helped
change the course of her conduct of life in a few sessions. Evaluating the consul-
tation sessions she – without being asked to – remarked on this in her final inter-
view. She explained that she had expected to have to talk about the event of
coercion, and was initially therefore surprised and confused at my asking questions
concerning her studies. But she saw this as very important in alleviating the distress
and difficulties she had been experiencing. As she had wanted to put the event
of coercion behind her, she had, during the first session with me, expressed reluc-
tance about her boyfriend’s suggestion that she contact the Centre. This reflection
may in a trauma-oriented approach be understood as denial that must be dealt
with through debriefing or other techniques. In a 1st person perspective approach
her reflections were personally relevant in relation to dilemmas in her conduct
of life at the time, and as such an important point of departure for common re-
flection involving the professional and the client.
Some Consequences for Therapy
A 1st person perspective approach to therapy involves exploring personal – not
abstracted – reasons for conduct of life across time and place, as it is here that
the personal meanings of experiences are developed. The above examples of
common issues reflected on in consultations and interviews suggest aspects that
are important to include in such an exploration in therapy and in help offered
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in other contexts to persons exposed to sexualised coercion. They are also sugge-
stive of the kind of issues to be dealt with in therapy in general: complex constel-
lations of personal issues, dilemmas, feelings, thoughts and actions connected to
persons' participation in the contexts of their lives.
In their efforts to be of help in therapy and counselling professionals, even
when they use classifications such as PTSD, most often take the specific aspects
of personal perspectives and experiences into account. Professionals, as the ones
Linder (2004) describes, make efforts to overcome what they consider the inade-
quacy of diagnostic criteria. They develop personal experience-based understan-
dings of 'trauma' in order to comprehend and relate to the diversity and specifi-
city of problems and meanings ascribed to them by clients. This may be viewed
as a lack of understanding of the solidity of diagnostic criteria and their import-
ance in guiding therapy and equally as unscientific, ineffective or even unethical
and damaging to persons in therapy. This critique emphasises positions and
perspectives of professionals as the experts, prioritising them and thus delegating
a position of power over the client and over the ways of giving and receiving help.
It is a form of power that in some ways may be coercive and thus reminiscent of
'traumatic' events in which, although with very different intentions, coercion
occurs. Yet for persons who have recently been subjected to coercion, such a po-
sition in therapy may in some instances duplicate their subjection to coercion.
Reductionist and expert-focused approaches have consequences for practi-
tioners as well, in as much as they constrict their agency, and therefore their
professional agency. It adds to the gap between theory and practice, in which,
instead of drawing on experiences from practice to develop theoretical understan-
ding, theoreticians develop theories and practitioners are expected to follow rules
deduced here from (Dreier 2006). They may be reduced to developing instrumen-
talised techniques at categorising symptoms and following directions for interven-
tions such as debriefing.
On the other hand taking departure in a 1st person perspective approach,
diversity in reflections allowed by the practices of such professionals as Linder
describes, emerges as a meaningful understanding of situated professional psycho-
logical practices, as practices concerned with the concrete and unique lives of
persons and the relevance of their agency. Hence, using concepts like participation
and contexts of practice to guide the common efforts at exploration of and reflec-
19Journal für Psychologie, Jg. 19(2011), Ausgabe 3
tion on clients' lives by professionals and persons seeking help may also enrich
theoretical development. And although questions and reflections of professionals
always co-construct answers, accounts and meanings some ways of asking questions
and reflecting may enhance clients' possibilities for voicing their own perspectives
and taking their lives into account.
As a consequence developing theory in practice and theory from practice
requires one as a professional to not let oneself be guided single-mindedly by
trauma talk or any other preconceived doctrine or practical technique. It requires
one – in cooperation with clients – to explore the unique complexity of personal,
common and situated reasons for their difficulties and distress. With clients
whose perspectives are informed by dominant diagnosis and trauma discourses,
it may imply exploring what this information means in their conduct of life.
Concerning distress connected to heavily gendered events such as sexualised
coercion it may include exploring situated personal as well as societal meanings
of gender. This is a very sensitive question. Unmasking the symbolic and practical
violence involved in gendering may easily be taken to be an unprofessional and
politicising approach to a practice that is most commonly understood as being
practised from a neutral position and standpoint (Callaghan 2005, Montero
2001). Leaving this 'neutral' ground may be designated as a lack of professional
ethics. It is also a reason why participants in this study were not presented with
many opportunities to broach the issue in therapy. But refraining from doing so,
I as a therapist contributed to the ongoing individualisation of difficulties follo-
wing the many diverse kinds of overwhelming events, which sexualised coercion
may be and become.
Aspects of therapy and other forms of psychological practice including a 1st
person perspective approach may be helpful in establishing psychological practices
in which power is not primarily delegated to professionals and to their perspectives.
They may promote an understanding of oneself and one’s conduct of life, as a
client as well as a professional, that helps keep a focus on complexities in the effort
to support agency by contextualising personal difficulties and distress. They can
be practices that counteract the helplessness and identification involved in the
looping effects and symbolic violence of 'natural kinds', which is widespread and
promoted in folk psychology by their use in theoretical and professional practices.
Furthermore the adopted approach points to the necessity of a critical community
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psychology as well as to changes in general societal practices concerning gender,
sexualisation, violence and the connections between them.
Conclusions
It is important to understand the criticism and approach presented here in no
way seeks to demean the pain and suffering of persons exposed to sexualised
coercion or other kinds of violent and/or overwhelming events. The concept of
trauma and research done in this tradition has been important in putting such
pain and suffering on public and research agendas. But the concepts of trauma
and traumatisation have become part of dominant discourses on the meanings
of events that may contribute to this pain and suffering. Furthermore, it may be
critiqued for, at the exclusion of other aspects of personal experiences, reducing
personal perspectives and experiences to symptoms fitting into a specific diagnosis
and elevating this into scientific laws with predictive force. It is an intentionally
reductive approach that often knowingly brackets the complexities of personal
lives, which understands the category as a 'natural kind' e.g. as a general human
phenomena independent of the diversity of meanings of lives in diverse contexts.
Instead of using reductive categorisations the approach of this article makes
use of analytical concepts in guiding our attention to connections between
agency of subjects and situated conditions for the conduct of life. Instead of being
an intentionally complexity-reductive categorising approach it is intentionally
complexity unfolding. As such, and with concepts that link persons with their
practice, it seeks to grasp the diversity of personal experiences and lives. This di-
versity would in dominant approaches be explained by such concepts as persona-
lity, individual coping mechanism or resilience. But again such concepts are re-
ductive and cause-and-effect oriented, overlooking the connectedness of emotio-
nality, cognition, action, intentionality, agency, and life conditions in personal
perspectives. As such they may even be seen as adding to psychologisation and
individualisation.
Therefore the approach presented here is based on a 1st person perspective.
It is proposed as an alternative to the simplification and 3rd person perspectives
inherent in dominant diagnostic approaches. In relation to questions of 'trauma-
tisation' a descriptive and analytic concept of symbolic violence, in which personal
meanings of violent events is understood as mediated through personally reflected
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complex participation in situated life, seems useful: firstly, it helps one to get a
critical grip on institutionalised and everyday life processes that co-create what
we conceptualise and objectify as trauma and traumatisation. Secondly, it does
so because it helps us get a nuanced understanding of concrete personal meanings
of experiences and reasons for thinking, feeling and acting as well as to connect
these reasons to life conditions. Thirdly, in doing so, it deepens our understanding
of why not all 'traumatic events' may be experienced as such by everybody.
Fourthly, it helps us understand how victimisation and 'traumatisation' do not
result from unique and delimited events, but are generated in connection with
specific situated meanings related to personal conduct of lives over time and
place. Fifthly, individualisation, naturalisation, pathologisation and victimisation
may then be unmasked as institutionalised, dominant, dominating, gendered
and gendering practices of symbolic, as well as connected to historical and cultural
relations of power. And finally this kind of approach contributes to closing the
gap between theory and practice in theory as well as in practice. In theory it points
to ways of including and analysing the complexity of personal perspectives and
experiences and understanding them as personally and psychologically practice-
related. In psychological practices it may guide us in understanding the great
variety of personal meanings that being subjected to apparently overwhelming
experiences may have, without having to categorise persons who do not feel or
behave in the dominantly expected way as repressed or in denial.
Summing up diverse relations of symbolic violence imbedded a. o. in folk
psychology*FOOTNOTE_REF_4* may be seen as interconnected and informed
by social sciences and other practices. All of these, being aspects of social conditi-
ons in which daily life is conducted, co-determine the personal and social mea-
nings of 'traumatic events' for those subjected to it as well for professionals and
others relating to them. No matter whether they accept and use aspects of what
can be understood as symbolic violence or reject them, it is part of the dominant
ways of understanding such events and as such co-construct their meanings. Yet
in these social processes, what we may expect to be a 'traumatising experience'
may not always fit dominant discourses and may fruitfully be understood in other
ways. The symbolic violence inherent in dominant trauma-talk, has looping effects
and may even blind us to other – but connected and severely agency restricting –
social processes and their consequences. Embodied dominant discourses and
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practices that seemingly facilitate the collaboration of men and women, boys and
girls, through subjecting and victimising practices contribute to the difficulties
of women exposed to sexualised coercion as well as to those of others exposed to
diverse overwhelming experiences of subjection. Women may be additionally
victimised by being designated by, as well as designating themselves and conduc-
ting their lives, in a way that is informed by gendered pathologising concepts
that reduce them to mere victims, just as this may be so for persons in general.
Here using the term 'in general' does not point to the symbolic violence of gene-
ralising psychologised characteristics and reactions seen as situated between the
ears of individuals. Rather it points to symbolic violence as an aspect of common
conditions for the conduct of life and its personal meanings. With this perspective,
reasons for suffering are not primarily and exclusively located in minds. Instead
suffering draws on the meanings of complex constellations of the conduct of
personal and common societal aspects of lives. In order not to contribute to indi-
vidualisation, psychological practice must let itself be informed by such aspects
of lives.
Notes
1. When not referring to dominant discourses, I use the term 'sexualised coercion'
instead of rape. I do so for several reason, some of which are: 1) That it does not
differentiate between rape and attempted rape, and thus does not lean on a
common assumption that rape is more 'traumatising' than attempted rape. 2)
That dominant and public discourses on rape are often dramatising and exploited
in media representations. And 3) that for this and other reasons many women I
spoke to were critical of the term, especially when used in the constellation 'rape
victims'. But it is important to note that, as sexual abuse in childhood is not im-
mediately comparable to rape and attempted rape, my paper does not apply to
this subject.
2. There are indications that this may be changing in Denmark.
3. Parker designates the network of theories and practices concerned with
psychological governance and self-reflection in Western cultures the 'psy complex'.
4. Folk psychology (Brunner 1990) draws heavily on academic psychology
and vice versa (Danziger 1990, Rose 1998) raising questions pertaining to the
ethical and political obligations of the research community.
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